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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of 
U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(b) (1996), as an appeal of a civil matter from final judgments of a district 
court. This matter has been certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(3) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was it error for the trial court to grant appellee Metropolitan Insurance 
Company's motion to dismiss the appellant's petition for adjudication of marriage for failure 
to adjudicate the petition within one year? Is the one year time limitation set forth in U.C.A. 
§30-1-4.5(2) unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied to appellant Juanita Gonzalez 
(hereinafter referred to as "Juanita")? In light of the fact that neither potential husband nor 
wife objected to adjudicating the appellant's marriage petition more than one year after the 
termination of the relationship, (assuming arguendo that the relationship terminated), did the 
court's granting of summary judgment based on the time limitation deprive Juanita Gonzalez 
of her constitutional rights, in violation of the open court's provision of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 11, the Equal Protection Clause of the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 24, and the Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 
7? 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the trial court's denial of Juanita's 
motion to dismiss appellee Metropolitan Insurance Company's (hereinafter referred to as 
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^Metropolitan") complaint in intervention, given the fact that Metropolitan had already 
issued a denial of Juanita Gonzalez's claim under the Metropolitan homeowner's policy? 
3. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition to allege 
that her relationship to Martin Briceno had not terminated, given the fact that there was no 
conflicting evidence, and given the fact that the couple had periods of estrangement and 
reconciliation during their thirteen year relationship? Was there sufficient evidence for the 
trial court to find that the facts demonstrated that Juanita's proposed amendment to her 
petition for adjudication would be futile, and that there were no facts to support a continuous 
relationship as alleged in the proposed second amended petition? 
4. Was there sufficient evidence for the Court to find that Metropolitan would be 
prejudiced by an amendment of the petition? 
5. Did the trial court err in granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment 
based on Juanita's failure to comply with the statutory time limitation as set forth in U.C.A. 
§30-1-4.5, given the fact that Metropolitan never pleaded this defense in its complaint in 
intervention? 
6. Did the trial court err in weighing the evidence and in resolving the matter of 
Juanita's credibility upon a motion for summary judgement, in light of the fact that she was 
not allowed the opportunity to testify before the court? 
7. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's objections to Metropolitan's proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the court's granting of Metropolitan's 
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motion for summary judgment? 
8. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's objections to Metropolitan's proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the court's denial of Juanita's motion 
to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention? 
9. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's objections to Metropolitan's proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the court's denial of Juanita's motion 
to amend her petition? 
10. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's motion to alter the court's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order with regard to the court's granting of Metropolitan's 
motion for summary judgment? 
11. Did the trial court err in denying Juanita's motion to alter the court's findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and order with regard to the court's denial of Juanita's motion to 
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Appellant preserved the above issues in the trial court as follows: 
Issues Regarding Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment: 
1. Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Record 190 -
203) 
2. Affidavit of Juanita Gonzalez in Support of Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss. (Record 185 -187) 
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3. Summary of Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. (Record 209 -
211) 
4. Objection to Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Granting Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record 402 - 405) 
5. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding 
Intervenor's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record 412 - 415) 
6. Petitioner's Proposed Order Granting Metropolitan's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Record 416 - 418) 
7. Petitioner's Motion and Memorandum to Alter the Findings. (Record 437 - 441) 
8. Transcript of Motions Hearing. (Record 460) 
Issues Regarding Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Adjudication of Marriage: 
9. Petitioner's Motion to Amend Petition for Adjudication and Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities. (Record 204 - 205) 
10. Petitioner's Proposed Second Amended Petition of Adjudication of Marriage. 
(Record 206 - 208) 
11. Reply in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Amend. (Record 262 - 265) 
12. Objection to Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Petitioner's Motion to Amend. (Record 391 - 401) 
13. Transcript of Motions Hearing. (Record 460) 
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Issues Regarding Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervener's Complaint: 
14. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenor s Complaint (Record 248 - 249) 
15. Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenors 
Complaint. (Record 250 - 261) 
16. Petitioner's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to 
Dismiss. (Record 286 - 310) 
17. Objection to the Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Intervenor. (Record 379- 390) 
18. Motion and Memorandum to Alter the Findings. (Record 437 - 441) 
19. Transcript of Motions Hearing. (Record 460) 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Motion for Summary Judgment. This case was dismissed pursuant to the trial 
court's grant of Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment may be 
granted only if the record shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
On review of a grant of summary judgment, the inquiry is whether there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Because 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Supreme Court reviews the trial court's 
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ruling for correctness. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994), and gives no 
deference to the trial court's legal determinations, Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 
P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. Utah 1993). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and the 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
2. Motion to Amend Petition. The trial court denied Juanita's motion to amend 
her petition for marriage adjudication. The trial court's denial of a motion to amend a 
pleading will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging 
Specialists, Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. Utah 1997); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 
1381, 1389 (Utah 1996). 
3. Findings of Fact. Appellant challenges several of the trial court's findings of 
fact. Findings of fact will not be overturned on appeal unless findings are clearly erroneous 
in light of the great weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court is otherwise definitely 
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 
969, 977 (Utah 1996). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses..." Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the appellant can 
show that they are without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by an 
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erroneous view of the law. Western Capital & Sees., Inc.v. Knudsvig. 768 P.2d 989 (Utah 
Ct. App), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
As a prerequisite to an attack on findings of fact, the appellant must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the findings and demonstrate "that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings. . ." Grayson 
Roper Ltd. V. Finlinson. 782 P.d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). The marshaling requirement 
supplies the reviewing court with a basis on which to conduct a meaningful and expedient 
review of facts challenged on appeal. 
4. Conclusions of Law. Appellant challenges several of the trial court's 
conclusions of law. Upon appellate review, conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference given to the trial court. Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969, 980 
(Utah 1996). 
5. Motion to Dismiss. The trial court denied Juanita's motion to dismiss 
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention for lack of standing to intervene, treating it as a 
motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the standard of review for a motion for summary 
judgment is applicable as set forth above. Furthermore, whether a party has standing is a 
question of law with respect to which the appellate court accords no deference to the ruling 
of the trial court. Architectural Committee of the Mt. Olympus Cove Subdivision No. 3 v. 
Kabatznick. 949 P.2d 776, 777 (Ct. App. Utah 1997). 
6. Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
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Motions to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Appellant objected to 
Metropolitan's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on the court's order 
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, order denying Appellant's motion 
to amend her petition, and order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss complaint in 
intervention, and then moved to amend said findings of fact and conclusions of law, all of 
which were denied by the trial court. Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
"When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or 
not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings 
or has made either a motion to amend them. . . ." The standard of review is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support the findings by the trial court. 
7. Constitutionality of Statutes. Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the 
time limitation provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5, both on its face and as applied to Juanita 
Gonzalez. The Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah. 681 P.2d 
199 (Utah 1984) analyzed the constitutionality of a statute which terminates the parental 
rights of the father of an illegitimate child if he fails to give the required timely notice of his 
claim of paternity. The Court held that a more stringent standard of review than 
"arbitrariness" or the rational basis test was applicable because the liberty right at issue was 
"fundamental" for purposes of due process. Wells, Id. at 206. The Court adopted the 
following standard of review for the constitutionality of any legislation infringing on parental 
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rights: 
There must be a showing of: 
(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved, and 
(2) that the means adopted are "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory 
purpose". 
Id. at 206, quoting In re Boyer. 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981). 
The statute in the case on appeal, U.C.A. §30-1-4.5, involves an individual's right to 
establish the existence of a marriage either retroactively or contemporaneously with the 
relationship, or both. A person's right to marry is a liberty right which the U.S. Supreme 
Court has deemed to be a "fundamental" right guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. 
Zablocki v. RedhaiL 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Therefore, the constitutional analysis of the time 
limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 should be undertaken by applying the more 
stringent standard of review set forth in Wells.681 P.2d at 206. 
The standard of review set forth in Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), mandates that in order for a statute to uphold 
constitutionality for due process, it must be constructed to provide notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to a determination of this case: 
10 
1. The statute regarding the adjudication of common law marriage, and the time 
limit for adjudication is found at Utah Code Annotated § 30- i -4.5. The full text is set forth 
in Addendum A. 
2. Statutes regarding the necessity of setting forth defenses specifically in the 
pleadings are found at Rule 8(c), Rule 12(a), Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. These provisions are set forth verbatim at Addendum B. 
3. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary 
judgment. Rule 56 is set forth in its entirety as Addendum C. 
4. Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs intervention of right. 
That rule is set forth in its entirety at Addendum D. 
5. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendment of pleadings 
and is set forth verbatim at Addendum E. 
6. Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs findings by the court and 
is set forth verbatim at Addendum F. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are relevant to the determination of this case: 
1. Utah Const., art. I, Section 11, the "open courts" provision is set forth at 
Addendum G. 
2. Utah Const,, art. I, Section 24, the "equal protection^ clause: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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3. Utah Const., art. I, Section 7. the "due process" clause: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1.4.5 is unconstitutional on its face, and as applied 
to Juanita Gonzalez. The purpose of the statute is to administer the orderly adjudication of 
common law marriages. It provides that a marriage must be adjudicated during the 
relationship or within one year following the termination of the relationship. The statute 
addresses two classes of individuals only, those who seek marriage adjudication of an 
ongoing relationship, and those who seek marriage adjudication of a relationship in 
contemplation of divorce. The statute does not address a third class of individuals to which 
Juanita belongs — those persons who initiate marriage adjudication proceedings in 
contemplation of divorce, but who later reconcile and seek to amend the petition to reflect 
that the relationship did not terminate. The statute does not define the termination of a 
relationship or define under what circumstances a relationship is to be deemed terminated. 
Nor does the statute address a situation where it has been longer than one year after the 
relationship has terminated, but neither potential husband nor wife objects to the passage of 
time, and it is only a third party intervenor who objects to the adjudication. 
The trial court denied Juanita5 s motion to amend her petition to reflect that she and 
Martin had reconciled and had not terminated their relationship. The court below found as 
a matter of law that when Juanita and Martin reconciled they established a "new" 
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relationship, rather than a continuation of the old relationship. The court then dismissed 
Juanita"s petition because it had not been adjudicated within one year from the date reflected 
on her original petition. The trial court applied the time limitation to a circumstance which 
was not addressed by the Utah legislature, and not defined within the language of the statute, 
resulting in the deprivation of Juanita Gonzalez' constitutional rights. The statutory time 
limitation, as applied to Juanita Gonzalez, violates the open courts provision, and the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the Utah Constitution. 
The trial court erred in granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment for the 
reasons that (1) there existed a disputed material fact as to whether or not Juanita and 
Martin's relationship terminated on October 21, 1995; (2) Metropolitan had not amended its 
complaint in intervention to allege the defense of petitioner's failure to adjudicate the 
marriage within one year of their breakup, contrary to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
therefore the matter was not properly before the trial court; (3) the matter would have been 
adjudicated within the one year time limitation had it not been for Metropolitan's 
intervention, and at all times Metropolitan's conduct demonstrated a willingness to waive the 
defense of the statutory time limitation, therefore Metropolitan should have been estopped 
from asserting the defense; and (4) the time limitation upon which the court based its order 
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment is unconstitutional on its face and/or 
as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. 
The trial court erred in denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition to conform to 
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the evidence that she and Martin had reconciled and that their relationship had not 
terminated, but was ongoing. The court's order was improper for the reason that (1) there 
was no evidence before the court to support its finding that Juanita and Martin had 
established a "new" relationship when they reconciled; (2) Metropolitan never raised the 
issue that it would be prejudiced by the amendment, and (3) there was no evidence before 
the court to support the finding that Metropolitan would be prejudiced if Juanita were 
allowed to amend her petition. The record shows that the couple had a stormy relationship 
with a history of domestic disputes, arguments, estrangements, separations, Juanita believing 
that the relationship was over, an eventual change of heart and reconciliations. This pattern 
of interaction between Juanita and Martin existed from September 1983, when they first 
moved in together, through October 21, 1995 to the present. During their 13 years together 
Juanita and Martin had three children together, Adrian, Jaime and Theresa. They always 
kept a family home. There was no evidence before the court upon which to base its finding 
that when Juanita and Martin reconciled in early 1997 it was not a continuation of their 13 
year relationship. 
Furthermore, Metropolitan never alleged in its memorandum opposing Juanita's 
motion to amend, or in its oral argument, that it would be prejudiced if Juanita were allowed 
to amend her petition. Metropolitan never produced any evidence, by way of affidavit or 
otherwise, to show that it would be prejudiced. The first time the issue of prejudice to 
Metropolitan was raised was in the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
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proposed order on Juanita's motion to amend, to which Juanita objected. Juanita was never 
given notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue. In weighing the balance of 
interests of Metropolitan and Juanita, it is clear that Juanita was more prejudiced by the 
court's denial of her motion than Metropolitan would have been had Juanita been given leave 
to amend her petition. Leave to amend should be freely given in the interest of justice. 
There was no evidence before the court that the interest of justice to Metropolitan was greater 
than the justice to which Juanita was entitled by allowing an amendment of her petition. 
The trial court erred in denying Juanita's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint 
in intervention for the reasons that after it denied Juanita's insurance claim, (1) Metropolitan 
no longer met the requirements of intervention set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 24; and (2) Juanita's stipulation allowing Metropolitan to intervene was based on 
misleading representations made by Metropolitan. Metropolitan's complaint in intervention 
alleges that Juanita is attempting to establish her marriage with Martin in order to defraud 
Metropolitan by claiming benefits under Martin's homeowner's insurance policy. The only 
interest Metropolitan ever alleged is its interest in protecting itself against any fraudulent 
claim for insurance benefits. During the pendency of the proceedings, Metropolitan 
unequivocally, and without reserving its rights under the policy, denied Juanita's claim for 
insurance coverage and benefits, before any court ruling on the merits of her petition. By 
doing so, Metropolitan's interest in protecting itself against fraud became moot, and 
Metropolitan no longer had standing to intervene. Metropolitan was no longer in danger of 
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being defrauded by Juanita because it was not going to pay her claim; it's interest in averting 
any (perceived) insurance fraud was fully protected by its final denial of insurance coverage 
and benefits. Metropolitan failed to produce any evidence to show what interest it still had 
in the proceedings, and how it would be impaired or impeded in protecting its interest if its 
complaint in intervention were dismissed. 
Furthermore, Metropolitan intervened on the basis that Juanita's insurance claim 
would depend on the trial court's ruling regarding her status as Martin Briceno's spouse. 
Based on this representation, Juanita stipulated to allow intervention. Metropolitan then 
denied Juanita's insurance claim before any court ruling on the merits. (Later, after its denial 
of Juanita's claim, Metropolitan then moved for summary judgment based on the time 
limitation.) The evidence supports Juanita's allegations that Metropolitan misled her (and 
the court) into believing that the court's determination of her marriage petition would dispose 
of the insurance company's obligations to her. If Metropolitan had intended to rely on the 
court's ruling to dispose of its rights and obligations to Juanita, it would have awaited a court 
ruling before issuing its denial to Juanita. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
This is an appeal from three orders issued by the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
District Court Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, pursuant to oral argument held on 
June 30, 1997: 
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1. Order granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, entered August 
5, 1997; 
2. Order denying Juanita Gonzalez' motion to amend petition, entered August 5, 
1997;and 
3. Order denying Juanita Gonzalez' motion to dismiss complaint in intervention, 
entered August 5, 1997. 
4. On July 23, 1997, Juanita Gonzalez objected to the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law proposed by Metropolitan on all three orders above. On August 5, 1997 
the court denied Juanita's objections. This appeal is from this order. 
5. On August 15, 1997 Juanita moved to alter the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, and to alter the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order denying Juanita's motion to dismiss complaint 
in intervention. The trial court denied Juanita's motions to alter the findings on October 8, 
1997. This appeal is from this order. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Juanita Gonzalez and Martin Briceno began living together in 1983. They had 
three children together, a son named Adrian, a son Jaime, and a daughter, Theresa. Juanita 
and Martin considered themselves to be husband and wife, although they had never 
formalized their union. She referred to Martin as "my husband", and he referred to Juanita 
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as iwmy wife". (Record 1) Only a few close friends and family members knew they had 
never gone through a formal ceremony. (Record 107-108) 
2. During the thirteen year period that Juanita and Martin lived together, they had 
several periods of estrangement. However, Martin never moved out of the family home, nor 
ever removed his personal belongings or clothing, nor ever changed his address or residence. 
(Record 262, Record 107) 
3. Several times Juanita called the police during domestic disputes, or when 
Martin's temper raged out of control. (Record 101) 
4. On October 21, 1995, following an argument, Martin Briceno intentionally set 
fire to the family home, destroying the home and all of the family's possessions. (Record 
190) 
5. Martin eventually pled guilty to arson and was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison, where he is currently serving time. (Record 358) 
6. Juanita subsequently filed an insurance claim with Metropolitan Property & 
Casualty Insurance Company, for property loss under a homeowner's insurance policy. 
(Record 11) 
7. Juanita was honest about her marital status and informed Metropolitan 
representatives that she and Martin were "common law" married. A Metropolitan adjuster 
told Juanita that she would need to be adjudicated as Martin Briceno's wife before 
Metropolitan would cover the damage. (Record 191, Record 250) 
18 
8. Juanita filed her petition for marriage adjudication on January 5, 1996. (Record 
1) 
9. Metropolitan filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, alleging that (1) Juanita was directed to file her petition for marriage 
adjudication by her public adjuster, (2) solely for the purpose of defrauding Metropolitan, 
'The whole purpose of this petition is to 'set up" Metropolitan" (quoted from Metropolitan's 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Intervene, p. 5.), and (3) that it would be grossly 
unfair to allow Juanita to proceed with her petition without permitting Metropolitan to 
present its evidence and defend its interests. In support of its motion to intervene, 
Metropolitan's memorandum reads, "Juanita Gonzalez' only hope of establishing any 
insurance coverage under the Metropolitan policy depends on her claimed status as a spouse 
of Martin Briceno." (Emphasis Added) (Record 10-15) 
10. Based on the foregoing language quoted from Metropolitan's pleadings that the 
issue of Juanita's insurance coverage depends on her marriage adjudication, and based upon 
Metropolitan's prior representations to Juanita that her claim would be paid if she were 
adjudicated married to Martin, Juanita stipulated to allow Metropolitan to intervene. 
(Record 28-29) 
11. On February 23, 1996 Metropolitan sent a letter to counsel for Juanita 
acknowledging that Metropolitan had received her proof of loss and claim for benefits under 
the policy. This letter states: 
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%;As your proof of loss acknowledges, the issue of whether Juanita is the 
spouse of Martin is open to question and subject to adjudication. I believe 
we both recognize that if Juanita is not the spouse of Martin, she has no claim 
whatsoever under the policy. Accordingly, with the issue of her status 
before the Court, it would be inappropriate for Metropolitan to make any 
payment at this time." (Emphasis Added) (Record 304) 
The letter also states that there are other serious questions regarding any coverage 
Juanita might have even if she were established as Martin's spouse. It also contains the 
sentence, "Metropolitan waives none of those defenses to coverage at this time." (Record 
304) 
12. Metropolitan's complaint in intervention alleges that "Metropolitan believes that 
this petition is filed as part of an attempt to defraud an insurance company by falsely 
attempting to establish a marriage where none existed." (Record 8) 
13. Juanita answered Metropolitan's complaint in intervention, denying the above 
allegation. (Record 26-27) 
14. The parties then proceeded with discovery. In April 1996 Metropolitan sent out 
more than 30 subpoenas to various governmental agencies, police departments, hospitals and 
healthcare facilities, banking institutions, retailers, and others, requesting documentation. 
(Record 32-33, 34-35, 37-38, 52-53, 57-58) Furthermore, Metropolitan conducted an 
extensive investigation of Juanita, including interviewing her neighbors regarding their 
knowledge of Juanita's marital status. (Record 375-376) 
15. On May 7,1996 Juanita filed a motion for a scheduling conference. (Record 42-
47) The court subsequently set July 31, 1996 as the date for the scheduling conference. 
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(Record 50-51) 
16. On June 4, 1996 Metropolitan denied Juanita's insurance claim, prior to any 
court determination of her marital status. (Record 259) The denial letter from Jeannette 
Castro, Claim Representative, to Tamara J. Hauge, attorney for Juanita Gonzalez, states (1) 
that Metropolitan "formally" denies her claim, (2) on the basis that she is not the spouse of 
Martin Briceno, and (3) that the denial is based, among other things, on Metropolitan's 
investigation with regard to Juanita's pending petition for marriage adjudication. The exact 
language of Metropolitan's denial is as follows: 
Metropolitan Insurance Company hereby formally denies the claim of your 
client, Juanita Gonzalez, dated June 4,1996. This denial is based upon, among 
other things, the facts and information developed by our investigation with 
regard to Ms. Gonzalez' pending petition in the Third Judicial District Court. 
Our investigation indicates that Ms. Gonzalez was not the wife of our insured, 
Mr. Briceno and, therefore, is not insured under our policy. Sincerely, Jeanette 
Castro, Claim Representative. 
This letter does not contain a reservation of rights provision. (Record 259) 
17. At the scheduling conference held July 31, 1996 the court set the trial date for 
January 7, 1997. (Record 55-56) 
18. On December 6, 1996, Metropolitan's first motion for summary judgment was 
heard. The motion did not allege that Juanita failed to adjudicate her marriage within the one 
year statutory time limitation, although the motion was heard after the expiration of the one 
year time limitation. (Record 64-82, Record 120-121) The only argument made by 
Metropolitan was that Juanita and Martin could not establish a uniform reputadon as husband 
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and wife. (Record 64-82, Record 120-121) Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment 
was denied, the trial court finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether Juanita and Martin held themselves out as husband and wife, and whether they 
obtained a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. (Record 127-128) 
19. The trial of January 7, 1997 was stricken by the court because a criminal matter 
took precedence. (Record 149) 
20. On March 19, 1997 Juanita filed a second request for a scheduling conference. 
(Record 173-174) A scheduling conference was set by the court for April 8. 1997. (Record 
171 -172) 
21. At the scheduling conference the court set the trial date for August 5, 1997, and 
a discovery cut-off date of June 13, 1997. (Record 175 -176) 
22. At the scheduling conference on April 8, 1997 counsel for Juanita informed 
Metropolitan's counsel that Juanita and Martin had reconciled, and that Juanita wanted to 
amend her petition to conform to the fact that they had reconciled. (Record 460, p. 2) 
23. On May 22 1997, in response to Metropolitan's denial of Juanita's and her 
children's claims, Juanita filed in her own behalf, and as guardian ad litem for her children, 
a complaint in federal court against Metropolitan, alleging breach of contract, breach of 
warranty, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, 
reformation of contract, and bad faith. (Record 355-378) 
24. On June 30, 1997, the following motions were heard before the Honorable 
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Tyrone E. Medley: 
a. Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment alleging failure to comply with the 
one year time limitation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) 
b. Juanita's motion to amend her petition to allege that her relationship with Martin 
had not terminated, but was ongoing 
c. Juanita's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention for lack of 
standing. (Record 460) 
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Juanita submitted her affidavit and 
proposed amended petition, stating that she and Martin had re-established their relationship, 
that it had not terminated on October 2 K 1995, but that it was ongoing. (Record 204-207) 
25. No affidavits were submitted by Metropolitan in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. Metropolitan based its motion on Juanita's prior testimony in the 
months shortly following the fire, during which time Juanita believed that her relationship 
with Martin was irreconcilable, and on the allegation in her prior petition that she believed 
their relationship was over. (Record 230-233, Record 460, pp. 1-9) 
26. Metropolitan's complaint in intervention does not assert the defense that the 
petitioner did not comply with the time limitations set forth in the statute for adjudication of 
marriage. (Record 5-9) 
27. Metropolitan never amended its complaint to assert the statutory time limits. 
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The statutory time limitation was pleaded for the first time in Metropolitan's motion for 
summary judgment. (Record 177-178) 
28. The trial court found as a matter of law that the allowance of the proposed 
amendment to state that the relationship had not terminated would be prejudicial to 
Metropolitan. (Record 427) However, the record shows that Metropolitan failed to allege 
that it would be prejudiced, either in its memorandum opposing Juanita's motion to amend 
(Record 230-233), or in oral argument. (Record 460, pages 1-9) Metropolitan did not 
submit any evidence, by way of affidavit or otherwise, to show how Metropolitan would be 
prejudiced by allowing Juanita to amend her petition. (Record 230 - 233) 
29. The trial court found as a matter of law that Juanita and Martin's relationship 
terminated no later than October 21,1995, and the fact that they may have commenced a new 
relationship does not alter that fact. (Record 427, para. 1) 
30. Metropolitan failed to produce any affidavit or submit any facts evidencing that 
Juanita and Martin's relationship was a "new" relationship, and not a part of their continuing 
relationship. (Record 230 - 233) Metropolitan merely asserted in oral argument that it was 
a "new" relationship. (Record 460, p. 7) 
31. The court found as a matter of law that there were no facts to support a 
continuous relationship as alleged in the proposed second amended petition. (Record 427, 
para. 2) 
32. Juanita's affidavit opposing Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment 
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alleges as fact that she and Martin had stormy periods in their relationship and had broken 
up and reunited several times in the past, and that although she thought their relationship was 
over after the fire, they had reconciled again. (Record 185 -186) 
33. There was no evidentiary hearing on these matters. (Record 460) 
34. On October 17, 1997 Juanita and Martin were married in a civil ceremony at the 




THE UTAH MARRIAGE ADJUDICATION STATUTE 
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED 
A. The time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) should be analyzed as a 
statute of repose. 
The time limitation imposed by U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose, and as such, 
requires an analysis distinct from a statute of limitations. The Utah Supreme Court in Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), analyzed Utah's product liability statute 
of repose, ruling it unconstitutional and in the process differentiated between statutes of 
repose and statutes of limitation. In Berry, Id., at 672, the Court characterized a statute of 
limitations as one that requires a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time after a 
legal right has been violated; for a claimant who fails to do so, the remedy for the wrong has 
been waived. The Court then characterized a statute of repose as one that "bars all actions 
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after a specified period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the 
occurrence of any injury that gives rise to a cause of action." Berry, Id. at 672. 
The time limitation provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is set forth as follows: 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must 
occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year 
following the termination of that relationship. 
The same characteristics exist in this time limitation as those characteristics 
recognized by the Court in the products liability statute of repose. U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 requires 
that the matter be determined within one year following termination of the relationship, 
rather than the commencement of the relationship. If the statute required adjudication within 
one year from the commencement of the relationship, it would be characterized as a statute 
of limitations in that the commencement of the relationship is the act which gives rise to the 
cause of action, i.e. the finding of a marital relationship. However, the statute requires 
adjudication within one year from the termination of the relationship, an occurrence other 
than that which gives rise to the cause of action. 
Considering this Court's respective definitions of statutes of repose and statutes of 
limitations, the time limitation set forth in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is a statute of repose, and should 
be recognized as such when analyzing the constitutionality of its application in the case at 
bar. 
B. Statutory Interpretation of U.C.A. §30-1-4,5. 
The starting point in interpreting the statute is the language of the statute itself. 
26 
According to the plain language of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), an unsolemnized (common law) 
marriage must be established either (1) during the relationship, or (2) within one year 
following termination of the relationship. In interpreting statutory text, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that departures from the statutory language are permitted in 
cases where the application of the unambiguous language produces an uabsurd result." 
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-70 (1994). The interpretation of 
U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) warrants a departure from the statutory language. 
The purpose and history of the statute are relevant aids to its interpretation. The 
statute was enacted to allow individuals meeting the criteria set forth therein to legitimize 
their relationship by establishing their marriage retroactively. The time limitation is meant 
to prevent a marriage from being adjudicated "twenty years after a relationship when the 
parties had no intention of a marriage." See transcript of Senate hearings; Recognition of 
Common Law Marriages, 1987: Hearing on S.B. 256; 47th Legislature, Addendum I. No 
other purpose behind the time limitation was articulated by the Senate. Unfortunately, the 
House Debate is unintelligible because of the quality of the tape. Clearly, the only purpose 
behind the time limitation as articulated by the legislature, was to protect the potential 
husband and wife against a marriage that neither intended. There is no evidence whatsoever 
that the legislature intended to prevent a couple who wanted to establish a marriage from 
participating in an adjudication more than one year after their relationship had terminated. 
In the case at bar, Metropolitan Insurance Company, an intervenor in Juanita Gonzalez' 
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petition for adjudication of marriage brought a motion for summary judgment. The order 
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment was based on a strict interpretation 
of the statute. Metropolitan did not argue that its rights would be prejudiced if the court 
made an exception to the literal reading of the statute. Importantly, neither Juanita nor 
Martin argued that extending the adjudication past the one year time limitation would 
prejudice their rights. 
U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) does not contemplate the situation described herein, and therefore 
does not address the issue of whether two parties to an action may, by mutual agreement, 
extend the time in which a judicial determination may be made. Furthermore, the statute 
does not define when a relationship is terminated, the circumstances under which a 
relationship is terminated, or who is empowered to decide when a relationship is terminated. 
Logically, that determination is best made by one or both parties to the relationship because 
they have the most intimate knowledge of the relationship. Nevertheless, contrary to Juanita 
Gonzalez' unrefiited testimony that the relationship had not ended, the lower court ruled that 
Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated on October 21, 1995 and that their current 
relationship was a "new" relationship. With this finding, the lower court by strictly applying 
the statutory language of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), ruled that Juanita had not adjudicated her 
marriage within one year from October 21, 1995, and dismissed her petition. 
By the lower court's ruling, the court has effectively determined that a couple who 
files a petition alleging termination of the relationship and who subsequently change their 
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minds and reconcile, cannot thereafter toll the statutory time limitation by amending the 
petition to reflect that the relationship had not in fact terminated, and that the couple must 
forge ahead with the adjudication proceedings as though they had not reconciled. This 
interpretation of the statute yields an absurd and harsh result, one which serves no purpose 
whatsoever. 
In interpreting the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) this Court should also 
consider public policy. It serves the interests of the public and the state to allow a marriage 
to be adjudicated where the couple otherwise qualifies, except for the time limitation. This 
is especially true where the couple has three children who will become legitimized by the 
marriage. As a general rule, marriage lessens the potential financial burdens of the state to 
provide cash and other benefits to dependent mothers with children. Spouses are legally 
obligated to support each other, freeing the state from potential welfare and medical care 
obligations which might exist if the couple were not married. Utah specifically recognizes 
that it has an interest in enhancing "more stable, satisfying, and enduring marital and family 
relationships." See U.C.A. §30-1-30. Further, it would seem to benefit society to allow a 
father to take responsibility for his family by establishing a marriage with the mother of his 
children. When parents participate in a marriage adjudication the parents' actions would 
certainly seem to demonstrate to the children of the union the importance of making a 
marriage commitment and a demonstration of the love that the couple bears toward each 
other. Two parents' participation in a marriage adjudication can only be beneficial to their 
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children who might feel stigmatized by their illegitimate status, and might feel embarrassed 
and insecure about their parents' relationship. 
In light of all the benefits and advantages to the family and to society as a whole, what 
purpose does it serve to allow an insurance company to use the statutory time limitation to 
prevent the adjudication of a marriage of a couple who has had a 13 year relationship and 
three children together? Where neither potential husband nor wife objects to having the 
marriage adjudicated more than one year after the couple has terminated their relationship, 
there is no possible advantage to the state or the public in preventing the couple from having 
their petition adjudicated. Applying the above analyses to U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), there is 
ample justification for a liberal interpretation of the statute. The lower court's strict 
application of the time limitation in this case lacks any principled basis. Such application 
fails to recognize the purpose of the statute and the inapplicability of the one year time 
limitation to the class of individuals to which Juanita belongs. 
POINT H 
THE UTAH MARRIAGE ADJUDICATION 
STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The issue of whether or not Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated or 
whether it was ongoing is a material fact which, in and of itself, is enough to defeat summary 
judgment, as discussed in Point V below. Nevertheless, the trial court granted 
Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. By imposing the strict one year time 
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limitation under these circumstances, the court deprived Juanita Gonzalez and Martin 
Briceno of their constitutional rights. The statute is overly broad in that it includes persons 
such as Juanita and Martin who should be allowed, by mutual consent, to stipulate to an 
extension of time for judicial determination of their marital status, or who have re-established 
their relationship thus making the time limitation inapplicable. Specifically, the statute as 
applied to the appellant, is unconstitutional in that it violates the open courts provision of the 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11; it violates the Due Process Clause of Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution; and violates equal protection under Article I, Section 24 
of the Utah Constitution. The Constitutional violations are addressed as follows: 
A. The Open Courts Provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, commonly known as the "open courts" 
clause, states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by 
himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Juanita Gonzalez has a constitutional interest in seeking a judicial determination of 
her marital relationship with Martin Briceno. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that marriage is a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. Zablocki v. 
RedhaiL 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Accordingly, the Utah legislature in enacting U.C.A. §30-1-
4.5 has carved out a process by which Juanita and all persons similarly situated may establish 
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an adjudication of marriage. However, the lower court's application of the time limitation 
in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) effectively bars Juanita from prosecuting her cause in the courts of 
the State of Utah, and is thus violative of the open courts provision. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar statute of repose in Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), holding that the Utah products liability statute of 
repose is unconstitutional. Given this Court's consistent application of Article I, Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution to time limiting statutes such as the one at bar, it is reasonable that 
the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. 
B. The Equal Protection Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. 
The one year time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 fails to afford Juanita equal 
protection under the law because the statute makes no exception for parties who mutually 
agree to extend the time past one year. Furthermore, the statute arbitrarily discriminates 
between petitioners whose petitions for adjudication are not contested and who can easily 
adjudicate the matter within the one year time limitation, and petitioners whose petitions for 
adjudication are contested and who may be precluded from a timely adjudication by the fact 
that a trial cannot be scheduled within a year because of circumstances outside the 
petitioner's control. In the case at bar, Juanita Gonzalez filed her petition for marriage 
adjudication on January 5, 1996. Martin Briceno was served with the petition on April 16, 
1996 and did not file objections to the petition. Metropolitan Insurance Company intervened 
on February 2,1996. Juanita filed a motion for scheduling conference on May 6,1996, and 
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a scheduling conference was held on July 31,1996 at which time Metropolitan requested 
time for discovery. Metropolitan thereafter undertook exhaustive discovery measures 
including sending out approximately 35 subpoenas duces tecum to various companies for 
records. The trial, which was scheduled for a second place setting for January 7, 1997, was 
canceled because the first place trial took precedence. Juanita"s marriage adjudication trial 
was then re-scheduled for August 1997. On April 10, 1997 Metropolitan filed its motion for 
summary judgment based upon petitioner's failure to comply with the statutory time limits 
of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5. 
Juanita Gonzalez never caused any delays in bringing her case to trial. Had it not 
been for the intervention of Metropolitan Insurance Company, and their extensive discovery 
requests, Juanita's marriage adjudication could easily have been determined within the one 
year time period. Juanita and Martin had re-established their relationship by the time 
Metropolitan filed its motion for summary judgment, which made the one year time 
limitation inapplicable; at that point, Juanita was seeking to establish her marital status 
during the pendency of her relationship with Martin. Nevertheless, if the trial court had 
determined that their relationship had terminated, Juanita and Martin were willing to agree 
to an extension of time within which to have the marriage adjudication determined. If it had 
not been for Metropolitan's acts in intervention, Juanita and Martin's marriage adjudication 
would have been determined ultimately by the court. 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 guarantees equal protection to the citizens 
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of the State of Utah, and forbids discrimination based upon arbitrary classifications. That 
provision states, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Case law has 
interpreted this section as follows: 
What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not 
operate uniformly if "persons similarly situated" are not 'treated similarly" or 
if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated as if their circumstances are 
the same." 
Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), citing Malan v Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
See also Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348. 352 (Utah 1989). Malan provides: 
Statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be 
based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives 
of the statute. 
Id. As stated above, the only legislative purpose for the one year time limitation is to prevent 
an adjudication occurring contrary to the intentions of the couple. This objective is not 
served through applying the strict limitation to individuals such as Martin and Juanita. In 
the case at bar, Juanita diligently pursued her marriage adjudication, but was unable to obtain 
a determination within one year because of circumstances enumerated above. In other cases 
there could be numerous reasons why a marriage adjudication proceeding could not be 
brought to trial within one year. If a trial judge falls ill at the time of trial, or some other 
emergency prevents counsel from attending a scheduled trial, these are also conceivable fact 
situations which would result in a petitioner losing her opportunity through no fault of her 
own to receive an adjudication of marriage. 
There is clearly a legitimate statutory objective in requiring an adjudication 
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proceeding to be commenced within one year of the termination of a relationship. Such a 
limitation would serve the same purpose that all statutes of limitation serve ~ to prevent stale 
claims from being brought where there is no evidence or witnesses to support the claim. 
However, to require that a matter be brought to trial within a certain period of time serves no 
purpose whatsoever under these circumstances where the petition was filed within the one 
year time period, where the parties to the relationship have re-established their relationship, 
and neither party to the relationship objects to the marriage adjudication proceedings. 
The stated legislative concern in enacting the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is 
that an adjudication will occur many years after a relationship has terminated against the 
intentions of the couple. Such a concern is adequately addressed by mechanisms which 
already exist in civil practice. 
The marriage adjudication statute attempts to treat petitioners similarly, who are not 
similarly situated. Petitioners whose petitions for adjudication are not contested are treated 
the same as petitioners who are subject to a complaint in intervention. Petitioners who do 
not object to the adjudication occurring after one year are treated the same as those who 
might object to an adjudication past the statutory time limit. The stated legislative purpose 
is not served by treating these two groups in a similar manner. It is arbitrary to deny 
adjudication of marriage to those petitioners who cannot get a trial date within one year, 
while allowing adjudications of uncontested petitions which can easily get to trial prior to 
the deadline. It is arbitrary to deny an adjudication to a couple who does not object to the 
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hearing occurring more than one year past the termination of their relationship. Such 
arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law is prohibited by Article I, Section 24 of 
the Utah Constitution which requires the uniform application of laws. 
C. The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7. 
The application of the time limitation in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 has deprived Juanita 
Gonzalez of her property7 and liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. This section provides, "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Case law shows that due 
process considerations are similar to equal protection analyses. In the case of Condemarin 
v. University Hosp.. 775 P.2d at 356, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Historically, the overlap between equal protection analysis and due process 
analysis has been considerable. . . both tests seek to ensure, as a matter of 
constitutional doctrine, that 'legislative action... be rationally related to the 
accomplishment of some legitimate state purpose.' 
citing Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic 
Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049 (1979). The following analysis of the time limitation 
provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is based on the standard of review set forth in Celebrity Club. 
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission. 657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), and shows that the 
statute violates Juanita's rights to due process and access to courts: 
1. Property Right. Juanita has a property and liberty right in establishing her 
marriage to Martin Briceno. The property rights which would inure to Juanita would include 
widow's social security benefits based upon Martin's earnings, benefits, inheritance from 
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Martin's estate, and interest in marital property acquired during the couple's relationship. 
Although the parties are legally married at this time, it would be advantageous to Juanita to 
have the couple's prior 13 year relationship legally adjudicated, which will entitle her to 
recognition of her contributions to the marriage during that period of time prior to the 
adjudication. In addition, Juanita has a property and liberty right in her marriage 
adjudication in that she seeks to gain society's recognition of her long-standing marriage 
relationship to Martin Briceno. Juanita and Martin held themselves out as a married couple, 
and only a few immediate family members and close, personal friends knew that they had 
not gone through a formal ceremony. After Metropolitan intervened in Juanita's marriage 
adjudication, Metropolitan informed Juanita's neighbors, the children's school principal, and 
personnel at Juanita's Catholic church that she and Martin had never been married. 
Metropolitan's actions created embarrassment for Juanita and her children and created even 
more reasons for Juanita to pursue her marriage adjudication with Martin; she wanted to save 
face in her community and legitimize the status of her three children. These are all important 
rights which Juanita seeks to preserve. 
2. Inadequate Notice. Juanita was not given adequate notice regarding the 
applicability of the time limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5. The statute does not 
address whether individuals seeking marriage adjudication may mutually stipulate to enlarge 
the time in which to establish their common law marriage. The statute does not address 
whether a third party intervenor may, unilaterally, invoke the statutory time requirements in 
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direct contrast to the wishes of the couple seeking marriage adjudication. The statute does 
not address whether persons who have alleged termination of their relationship in 
contemplation of divorce and who later reconcile but wish to continue their marriage 
adjudication proceedings, may amend their petition for marriage adjudication to reflect their 
reconciliation, thus making the one year time limitation inapplicable. 
The statute, as written, did not provide notice to Juanita that she needed to ask for an 
expedited hearing because she would not be allowed to stipulate to extend the time in which 
to establish the marriage. Had she known that the time limit would be enforced strictly 
against her, she could have objected to the exhaustive discovery performed by Metropolitan, 
and she could have asked for a first place trial setting. This lack of notice directly resulted 
in the dismissal of Juanita's petition for marriage adjudication. 
3. Inadequate Hearing. Juanita was not given an opportunity to present evidence 
of her ongoing relationship with Martin. The statute does not address under what 
circumstances a relationship is deemed irrevocably terminated to make the one year time 
limitation provision forever applicable. The statute does not enumerate circumstances that 
would support a presumption that a relationship has terminated. The statute does not address 
whether a third party may contest a couple's allegations of a continuing relationship. Nor 
does the statute provide for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a couple's 
relationship has terminated. 
The trial court ruled in Metropolitan's favor despite the fact that Metropolitan failed 
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to submit any evidence to show that Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated for 
purposes of the statute, or that their current relationship was a "new" one. (Record 460) 
Metropolitan never produced any evidence whatsoever to support its argument. (Record 230 
- 233; Record 460) The trial court made its ruling based on Metropolitan's mere conclusory 
statements made at oral argument. (Record 460). 
Juanita was never given the opportunity to establish the existence of her ongoing 
relationship with Martin at an evidentiary hearing. If an evidentiary hearing had been held, 
Juanita would have been given a chance to prove her ongoing relationship by her own 
testimony, the testimony of family members and friends, and by way of document production 
showing a continuation of their marital reputation, and their commingled finances and family 
obligations. 
Because the statute is deficient by failing to enumerate particularities as described 
above, and because it does not provide for an evidentiary hearing on this pivotal point, 
Juanita5s marriage adjudication petition was dismissed for failure to meet the statutory time 
limitation. 
The time limitation provision in U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is unconstitutional both on its face 
and as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. The statutory deficiencies discussed above allowed 
Juanita to be deprived of her property and liberty interest in establishing her marriage to 
Martin Briceno, specifically by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. In 
analyzing the time limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 under the standards set forth by 
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the Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 
1984), in order to be constitutional, there must be a showing of: 
(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and 
(2) that the means adopted are "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory 
purpose". Id. at 206, quoting In re Boyer. 636 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah 1981). These issues 
are discussed as follows: 
1. Does the state have a compelling interest in the result to be achieved? The 
state's interest in the timely establishment of a marriage under the statute is to avoid the 
societal and economic difficulties inherent in a situation where a party, many years after the 
termination of a relationship, desires to establish a marriage where it was never the intent of 
the parties to enter into marriage. The state's interest was stated precisely and succinctly 
during the Senate debate on Senate Bill 156. (Transcript of Senate Hearing, Addendum 
i.) 
2. Are the means adopted narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose? 
The means by which the U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) purports to achieve its purpose is by mandating 
that a marriage be established within one year from the date a couple's relationship is 
terminated. This requirement is overly broad and is not sufficiently narrow to achieve the 
basic purpose of the statute. A strict requirement that a marriage be established within one 
year fails to consider the following circumstances: 
a. Where a third party intervenes which may require a longer period of time for 
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discovery procedures; 
b. Where the parties to a marriage adjudication proceeding wish to stipulate to 
enlarge the period of time within which to establish a marriage; 
c. Where the parties file for marriage adjudication in contemplation of divorce* and 
who later reconcile but wish to continue with the marriage adjudication; 
d. Where the trial court cannot schedule a trial on the merits within the one year 
time period due to scheduling conflicts or other conflicts; 
e. That there are other safeguards in place in the Rules of Civil Procedure which 
are designed to facilitate the timely adjudication of lawsuits, which are utilized by the parties 
to litigation and on the court's own motion. 
The requirement that a marriage be established within one year is not only 
burdensome on both the parties to the action and the court calendar, but can result in 
the deprivation of constitutional rights as in the present case. A more narrowly 
tailored requirement that the petition for marriage adjudication be filed within one 
year from the date a relationship terminates will achieve the statutory purpose 
intended by the Utah Legislature. The time limitation provision of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 
is unconstitutional in that it is not sufficiently narrow to achieve the statutory purpose. 
Even if U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2), were not found to be unconstitutional on its face, it is 
unconstitutional as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. The Utah Supreme Court in Ellis v. Social 
Services Dept.. 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) upheld the constitutionality of the statute 
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terminating the parental rights of an unmarried father, but declared the statute to be 
unconstitutional as applied to the appellant. The Court held that the statute could not be 
applied to deprive the father of his parental rights without a hearing at which he would have 
"an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably 
have expected his baby to be born in Utah/* Ellis, Id. at 1256. As stated above, the statute 
at issue in this appeal, as applied to Juanita Gonzalez, deprived her of due process in that she 
was not afforded notice and an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter 
that her relationship with Martin had not terminated, but was ongoing. 
Juanita has a fundamental right afforded by the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah to legitimize her status as a married woman during her 
relationship with Martin Briceno, and to legitimize the status of her three children. The time 
limitation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5, as applied, bars Juanita from pursuing her property and 
liberty rights in having her marriage adjudicated. The law affords no other remedy to 
Juanita. 
POINT IH 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INTERVENOR'S 
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION 
A. Legal Standard 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's Findings 
of Fact, appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding 
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and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, . . 
. The legal sufficiency of the evidence is determined by the. . ."clearly 
erroneous" standard. ... A finding attacked as lacking adequate evidentiary 
support is deemed "clearly erroneous" only if we conclude that the finding is 
against the clear weight of the evidence. 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha. 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). The failure to enter adequate 
findings of fact on material issues may be reversible error. Id. A finding may be deemed 
clearly erroneous either if it is without "adequate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law." T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 at 909 (Utah App. 1988), quoting 
Wright & Miller. Federal Practice & Procedure, §2585, p. 193 (1971). 
B. Metropolitan's Standing to Intervene and the Trial Court's Findings. 
Specifically, Juanita Gonzalez challenges the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law made by the trial court in denying Juanita's motion to dismiss the 
complaint in intervention: 
Finding of Fact #9: There are no facts before the Court to demonstrate that the 
petitioner was misled in any way. To the contrary, the letter from 
Metropolitan's counsel made clear that in order to claim coverage under the 
policy, petitioner would have to first establish her status as the spouse of 
Martin Briceno and then would face other policy defenses. 
Finding of Fact #10: Metropolitan's interest will be directly affected by any 
adjudication in this matter. If petitioner is established as the spouse of Martin 
Briceno, she may be entitled to make claim under Martin Briceno's insurance 
policy with petitioner. 
Conclusion of Law #1: Petitioner has previously stipulated to allow the 
Complaint in Intervention in this case. Petitioner has presented no valid legal 
basis for her withdrawal of that Stipulation. 
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Conclusion of Law #2: Metropolitan falls squarely within Rule 24(a)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding intervention. Petitioner has an 
interest relating to the subject matter of this action and is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as practical matter impair its ability to protect 
that interest. Additionally, petitioner's interest is not adequately represented 
by any other existing party. 
Conclusion of Law #3: Metropolitan has not misled petitioner in any manner 
and there is no basis to assert any wrongdoing or other action that would 
preclude or estop Metropolitan from pursuing its Complaint in Intervention in 
this matter. 
C. Marshaling of Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings. 
The following evidence, stated from the defendant's point of view, supports the 
challenged Findings of Facts.1 
1. The letter of Robert L. Stevens to Juanita's counsel dated February 23, 1996 
states, "As you know, there are other serious questions regarding any coverage Juanita might 
have even if it were established that she was the spouse of Martin." This letter was sent to 
Juanita's counsel after Metropolitan filed its motion to intervene, but before Juanita 
stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention. (Record 304) 
2. Juanita's proof of loss filed with Metropolitan states that she is making a claim 
as the innocent spouse of Martin Briceno. The proof of loss form notes "adjudication 
pending of spousal status." (Record 277) 
Plaintiff hastens to point out that she does not agree that these points are 
sustainable or well-taken. However, the requirement is to marshal the evidence in a 
manner most favorable to the verdict and the above statements represent the most 
favorable manner in which the evidence could be construed as supporting the errant 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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3. During Juanita's sworn statement of January 29, 1996, she testified that she was 
advised by her public adjuster that she should file a marriage adjudication proceeding to 
establish her marriage to Martin Briceno. (Record 11-12) 
4. Metropolitan asserted in its complaint in intervention that "Metropolitan believes 
that this petition is filed as part of an attempt to defraud an insurance company by falsely 
attempting to establish a marriage where none existed." (Record 8) 
D. Evidence Legally Insufficient to Support Findings. 
The following evidence demonstrates the lack of the evidentiary support and the 
clearly erroneous nature of the findings relating to the trial court's denial of Juanita's motion 
to dismiss. 
1. The evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to the court below, is 
legally insufficient to support the court's findings insofar as they find that Metropolitan's 
interest in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeds was sufficient to support its standing to 
intervene. These findings are clearly erroneous, not only because they lack evidentiary 
support when the undisputed evidence is viewed fairly, but the findings are based upon an 
erroneous view of the law. 
A party's right of intervention is determined by Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which allows intervention as stated below: 
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject matter of the action and he is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability 
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented 
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by existing parties, id 
The requisite standing must exist, not only at the outset of intervention, but throughout the 
litigation. If a party's interest in the litigation is extinguished, it's interest is rendered moot, 
and intervention is no longer appropriate. Mootness is inextricably tied to the doctrine of 
standing to assure that the court is presented with a dispute that it is capable of resolving. 
As defined by one commentator, mootness is "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: 
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation 
(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness). Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). 
When Juanita stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention, it was believed hat 
Metropolitan had an interest in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceedings, because Juanita 
would be defined as an "insured" under Martin's Metropolitan insurance policy if her 
marriage adjudication was successful. However, once Metropolitan unequivocally denied 
Juanita's claims, its interest in her marriage adjudication proceeding was rendered moot. 
Juanita moved to dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention for lack of standing to sue 
under Rule 24(a) U.R.C.P., and offered into evidence Metropolitan's letter denying coverage 
and benefits to Juanita prior to the trial court's ruling on the marriage adjudication. 
Thereafter, it was Metropolitan's burden to show that it retained an interest in the 
proceedings, and that intervention was necessary to protect its interest. 
2. There is no evidence to support Metropolitan's conclusory allegations that 
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following its denial of coverage and benefits to Juanita, it still had an interest in her 
marriage adjudication proceedings. On June 4, 1996, Metropolitan denied all coverage 
and benefits under the insurance policy to Juanita Gonzalez. The unequivocal denial of 
benefits to Juanita Gonzalez demonstrated that Metropolitan had no direct interest in the 
outcome of Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding. Metropolitan resisted Juanita's 
motion to dismiss, arguing that it still had an interest in the proceeding, but failed to allege 
what its interest was at that point. If Metropolitan meant that an ultimate decision favorable 
to Juanita would cause Metropolitan to reverse its denial at a later date and pay benefits to 
Juanita, then Metropolitan, arguably, may have retained an interest in the litigation. 
However, Metropolitan did not allege this, or any other reason why it still had an interest in 
the proceedings after the issuance of its denial letter. 
After Metropolitan finally and formally denied benefits to Juanita, without reserving 
its rights under the policy, what possible interest did it still have in Juanita's marriage 
adjudication proceeding? Metropolitan asserted in its memorandum in opposition to 
Juanita's motion to dismiss that it still had an interest in the litigation; however, it failed to 
state what exactly its interest was at that point. 
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention alleged that it believed Juanita had filed to 
establish a marriage in order to defraud Metropolitan. After Metropolitan's formal denial of 
Juanita's claim under the policy, how could the establishment of her marriage thereafter 
defraud Metropolitan? Metropolitan could not possibly have been in danger of being 
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defrauded at that point because Metropolitan made it clear that they were never going to pay 
her anything! Therefore, if Metropolitan's interest was to avoid being the victim of insurance 
fraud (as it alleged in its complaint), its interest was effectively protected by denying 
Juanita's claim, because Metropolitan cannot be the victim of insurance fraud when it has 
no intention of paying a claim it suspects of being fraudulent! Likewise, there is not one 
shred of evidence in the record to support Metropolitan's claim that a disposition of Juanita's 
action (after it denied her claim) would impair or impede its ability to protect any claimed 
interest in the litigation. Metropolitan could have submitted affidavits from claims 
representatives and/or expert witnesses within the insurance claims industry to show that it 
still retained an interest in the proceedings, and to identify what interest it claimed. 
Metropolitan failed to claim any potential future injury. Although the intervenor's complaint 
alleged that it believed Juanita was attempting to defraud the insurance company, 
Metropolitan's argument in opposition to Juanita's motion to dismiss completely failed to 
allege what harm it feared. 
Furthermore, Metropolitan failed to cite any precedent or discuss any similar cases 
on point. The trial record contains only one conclusory statement in Metropolitan's 
memorandum in opposition to Juanita's motion to dismiss, "It is readily evident that 
Metropolitan has an interest in the transaction which is the subject of this action and that 
determination of whether Juanita is the spouse of Martin will as a practical matter impair 
Metropolitan's ability to protect its interest." (Record 272) Such an unsupported allegation 
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is not sufficient to allow intervention by a third party in a marriage adjudication. 
This lack of any evidence shows that the trial court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. The trial court erred in not granting Juanita's motion to dismiss Metropolitan's 
complaint in intervention because there is insufficient evidentiary support for Finding of Fact 
No. 10, and Conclusions of Law Nos.i and 2. 
3. Juanita Gonzalez stipulated to allow Metropolitan to intervene under a 
mistaken reliance that Metropolitan would pay benefits if the trial court found in favor 
of her marriage adjudication. Juanita held this belief because of the prior representation 
made to her by a Metropolitan representative. Furthermore, Metropolitan alleged in its 
motion to intervene that "Juanita's only hope of establishing any insurance coverage under 
the Metropolitan policy depends on her claimed status as a spouse of Martin Briceno." 
(Record 10 - 15) The clear implication of Metropolitan's allegation is that a judicial 
determination of Juanita's marital status would determine Metropolitan's obligations under 
the policy, and that the issue of her marital status was the only determinative factor. 
On Feburary 23, 1996 Metropolitan sent a letter to counsel stating, " . . . with the issue 
of her [Juanita's] marital status before the Court, it would be inappropriate for Metropolitan 
to make any payment at this time." (Emphasis Added) (Record 304) Once again, 
Metropolitan's communication with Juanita centers the question of payment to her around 
the determination of her martial status. The last paragraph of Metropolitan's letter is a 
general non-waiver included as a matter of course in most insurance matters where coverage 
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is at issue; however. Metropolitan never at any time verbally discussed or communicated to 
Juanita in writing any other defenses they intended to raise to her insurance claim. 
Based on the aforementioned verbal and written communications, and court pleadings 
filed by Metropolitan, Juanita stipulated to the intervention believing that if she prevailed in 
her marriage adjudication proceeding, Metropolitan would pay her claim. 
When Metropolitan denied Juanita's claim on June 4, 1996, it did so based upon its 
own assessment of her marital status "among other things." This shows that, in fact, 
"Juanita's only hope of establishing any insurance coverage under the Metropolitan policy" 
did not depend at all "on her claimed status as a spouse of Martin Briceno." (Quotations 
taken from page 4 of Metropolitan's Memorandum in support of its motion to intervene. 
Record 10 - 15, Record 259) Contrary to its prior verbal and written assurances and 
allegations, Metropolitan did not await the trial court's ruling before determining their 
obligations under the policy. 
Had Metropolitan been forthcoming in its motion to intervene, and had it revealed 
its true intention to deny benefits to Juanita regardless of the trial court's ruling, Juanita 
would never have stipulated to Metropolitan's intervention. Metropolitan mislead Juanita 
into believing that it would pay or deny her claim based on the trial court's ruling. 
The issue of an insurance carrier's intervention in litigation has been addressed by this 
Court in limited circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that an insurance carrier may 
intervene in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist. See Lima v. Chambers. 
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657 P.2d 279 (Utah 1982). The Court, in acknowledging an insurer's right to intervene, 
stated that uto justify intervention, the party seeking intervention must demonstrate a direct 
interest in the subject matter of the litigation such that the intervenor's rights may be 
affected, for good or for ill." Lima, Id. at 282, quoting State v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 
(Mo.App. (1963). The Court reasoned that the insurer was bound by the trial court's ruling 
pursuant to Utah statute requiring uninsured motorist coverage, and therefore had a direct 
interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit. The Court stated: 
. . .[the required] interest does not include a mere, consequential, remote or 
conjectural possibility of being in some manner affected by the result of the 
original action. It must be such a direct claim upon the subject matter of the 
action that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct operation of the 
judgment to be rendered". Lima, Id. at 282. (Emphasis Added). 
The case at bar is distinguished from Lima and its progeny in that Metropolitan had 
no statutorily mandated interest in the subject matter, i.e. there is no state law requiring an 
insurer to automatically cover a spouse's property under a homeowner's insurance policy, 
whereas in Lima, the uninsured motorist statute acted to bind the insurer to the court's ruling. 
Therefore, in order for Metropolitan to qualify as having a direct interest in the subject matter 
of the action, Metropolitan asserted that it would be bound by the trial court's decision, and 
would recognize its contractual obligation to pay Juanita in the event she was found to be 
the wife of Martin Briceno. When Metropolitan thereafter denied benefits to Juanita prior 
to the trial court's ruling, it effectively demonstrated that it had no intention to be bound by 
the court's ruling. 
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Metropolitan's interest in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding was, at most, 
a mere, consequential or remote interest. Metropolitan could only conjecture the possibility 
of being in some manner affected by the result of Juanita's marriage adjudication 
proceedings. It wrongfully gained intervention in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding 
by taking the position that it would be bound by the trial court's ruling. 
In considering the issue of intervention in Lima, the Utah Supreme Court looked to 
other states' decisions, and relied on many Missouri cases, including Alsbach v. Bader. 616 
S.W.2d 147 (Mo.App. 1981), addressing whether an auto insurer should be allowed to 
intervene in an uninsured motorist action. In Alsbach, Id., the Missouri Supreme Court 
stated that "only if we were to find the insurer would not be bound could we stop the insurer 
from intervening." Alsbach, Id. at 155. In the case at bar, Metropolitan has failed to assert 
how it will be affected by any decision in Juanita's marriage adjudication proceeding now 
that it has denied her claim. Furthermore, it is now clear that it never intended to be bound 
by the trial court's ruling. 
Under these circumstances, the lower court erred in not granting Juanita's motion to 
dismiss Metropolitan's complaint in intervention, and specifically erred in Finding of Fact 
No. 9 and Conclusion of Law No. 3. The record shows there are ample facts to demonstrate 
that Juanita was misled by Metropolitan in stipulating to the intervention. 
The trial court further erred in denying Juanita's objections to the findings, and its 
denial of her motion to alter the findings for the aforementioned reasons, and based upon the 
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evidence on record. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
JUANITA'S MOTION TO AMEND HER PETITION 
A. Legal Standard, The trial court's denial of motion to amend a pleading will 
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Otsuka Electronics v. Imaging Specialists, 
Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Ct. App. Utah 1997); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1389 
(Utah 1996). The proper legal standard in determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous 
is a showing that the finding is without "adequate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law." T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 at 909 (Utah App. 1988), quoting 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 2585, p. 193 (1971). 
B. Juanita's Motion to Amend and The Trial Court's Findings. 
Appellant challenges primarily Findings of Fact Nos. 8 and 9, and Conclusions of Law 
Nos. 1, 2 and 3, set forth as follows: 
Finding of Fact No. 8: The Court finds that petitioner had a relationship with 
Martin Briceno commencing September 1983 that terminated no later than 
October 21, 1995. 
Finding of Fact No. 9: The Court finds that petitioner may have commenced 
a new relationship with Martin Briceno in the spring of 1997 but that under the 
facts presented and petitioner's own recently filed affidavit, her prior 
relationship with Martin Briceno ended no later than October 21, 1995. 
Conclusion of Law No. 1: Petitioner's relationship with Martin Briceno 
commenced September 1983 and terminated (as that term is utilized in Section 
30-1-4.5 Utah Code Annotated) no later than October 21, 1995. The fact that 
petitioner may have commenced a new relationship with Martin Briceno in the 
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spring of 1997 does not alter the fact that her previous relationship under the 
statute was terminated. 
Conclusion of Law No. 2: The facts before the Court demonstrate that 
petitioner's proposed amendment would be futile, there being no facts to 
support a continuous relationship as alleged in the proposed second amended 
petition. 
Conclusion of Law No. 3: The allowance of the proposed amendment at this 
late date would be prejudicial to the complainant in intervention in view of the 
fact that the discovery cutoff date has passed and a trial date set. 
C. Marshaling of Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings. 
The following evidence, stated from the defendant's point of view, supports the 
challenged Findings of Facts.2 
1. Juanita alleged in her petition for marriage adjudication that her relationship 
with Martin Briceno terminated on October 21, 1995, the day of the fire. (Record 1-2) 
2. On January 29, 1996 Juanita gave a sworn statement to Metropolitan, testifying 
that her relationship with Martin Briceno ended in June 1995. (Record 460, p. 5) 
3. On December 19,1996 the parties stipulated to allow Juanita to filed an amended 
petition for marriage adjudication. (Record 133 -134) However, an amended petition was 
never filed. 
4. Juanita never alleged any confusion or misunderstanding in the preparations of 
2Plaintiff hastens to point out that she does not agree that these points are 
sustainable or well-taken. However, the requirement is to marshal the evidence in a 
manner most favorable to the verdict and the above statements represent the most 
favorable manner in which the evidence could be construed as supporting the errant 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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her previous petitions or in her testimony. (Record 460, Record 1-2, Record 185 -187, 
Record 204 - 205, Record 206 - 208) 
D, The Evidence is Legally Insufficient to Support the Findings. 
The following evidence demonstrates the lack of the evidentiary support and the 
clearly erroneous nature of the findings relating to the trial court's denial of Juanita's motion 
to amend. 
The evidence, even viewed in a light most favorable to the court below, is legally 
insufficient to support the court's findings that Juanita and Martin had terminated their 
relationship on October 21, 1995 within the meaning of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5. Juanita and 
Martin began living together in 1983, and produced two sons and a daughter together, 
Adrian, Jaime and Theresa Briceno. The couple always maintained a family residence. 
However, the nature of Juanita and Martin's relationship is not unlike many marital 
relationships that are less than perfect. The facts in evidence show that Juanita and Martin's 
relationship included brief periods of estrangement, however they always reconciled and 
resumed their marital relationship. Juanita has been consistent in describing her relationship 
with Martin. Her testimony and the facts in evidence support her allegations of a continuing 
relationship with Martin. 
Following the fire Metropolitan took three recorded statements from Juanita. She 
testified during a sworn statement on January 29,1996. During these interviews, Juanita has 
consistently described her relationship with Martin Briceno as a stormy one. She was 
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forthcoming about the fact that she and Martin had been estranged for periods of time in the 
past when he left the family home, but always returned. She was emphatic that Martin never 
moved his possessions out of the house or changed his address. Although she was angry 
enough with Martin to consider the relationship permanently terminated in October of 1995, 
her feelings subsequently changed, as feelings do. In the spring of 1996 Juanita and Martin 
reconciled. She told him that she was going to withdraw her petition for a divorce in 
connection with the marriage adjudication proceedings. The record shows that 
Juanita's relationship with Martin has been continuous and ongoing since September 1983, 
despite their domestic difficulties and periods of estrangement. There were no intervening 
engagements, or marriages with third parties. The nature of Martin and Juanita's relationship 
from the date of its inception through October 21, 1995, the date of the fire, is not different 
from the nature of their relationship from October 21, 1995 to the present. From September 
1983 to the present the couple's relationship has consistently included disputes, arguments, 
and times that the couple declared it to be "over." The fact that it was not over is obvious 
from the fact that the couple is now legally married. 
It is important to note that Metropolitan has not disputed that Juanita and Martin's 
relationship existed on October 21, 1995. Metropolitan's only dispute is that it was a 
relationship qualifying for marriage adjudication. The evidence shows that the general nature 
of Juanita and Martin's relationship did not change after the fire. They resumed their pattern 
of interaction and reconciled as they had done numerous times before. 
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The trial court disregarded the evidence of Juanita and Martin's history together 
showing that Juanita* s prior testimony is consistent with the nature of her relationship with 
Martin. The notion that each time Juanita and Martin reconciled their differences following 
a domestic dispute sparked the commencement of a "new relationship" completely ignores 
the very real nature of an ongoing martial relationship with good periods of time separated 
by bad, and sometimes tragic, episodes. 
The determination of whether or not an individual is in a relationship is highly 
subjective, and therefore the testimony of the party involved in the relationship should be 
given great weight; certainly more weight than the testimony of an insurance company 
attempting to discredit the relationship. 
Furthermore, the trial court's finding that Metropolitan would be prejudiced by 
allowing Juanita to amend her petition is not only completely without evidentiary support, 
but prejudice was never alleged by Metropolitan, either in its memorandum opposing the 
motion, or at oral argument. The word "prejudice" with regard to Metropolitan does not 
appear anywhere in Metropolitan's memorandum (Record 230 - 233) or in the transcript of 
the hearing.(Record 460) The first time any notion of prejudice was raised was in 
Metropolitan's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law! The trial court erroneously 
adopted this finding without considering the fact that the issue of prejudice had not been 
raised in the pleadings or at oral argument. 
E. The Findings were Induced by an Erroneous View of the Law. 
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Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the amendment of pleadings. 
It states in relevant part: 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before 
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the 
trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. 
Otherwise, a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires..." 
Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition 
to state that she and Martin had not terminated their relationship. The plain language of Rule 
15(a) mandates that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. Justice 
required that Juanita's constitutional rights be protected, and the trial court's ruling failed to 
protect her rights. Instead, the trial court ruled that the proposed amendment "at this late 
date would be prejudicial to the complainant in intervention in view of the fact that the 
discovery cutoff date has passed and a trial date set". Conclusion of Law No. 3. (Record 424 
-428) 
The trial date was scheduled for August 5, 1997. Juanita filed to amend her petition 
on April 23, 1997, four months before the scheduled trial. Furthermore, Metropolitan was 
informed at the pretrial settlement conference on April 8, 1997 that Juanita and Martin had 
reconciled. The trial court heard Juanita's motion on June 30,1997. Although the discovery 
cut off date had passed by the date of the hearing, Metropolitan failed to show how it would 
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have been prejudiced by allowing an amendment. In fact. Metropolitan never alleged that 
it would be prejudiced if Juanita were allowed to amend her petition. 
Utah law is clear that in considering motions to amend, the primary consideration is 
whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether any party receives an 
unfair advantage or disadvantage. Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc.. 786 P.2d 1350 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In the case at bar, Metropolitan failed to show that it would not be 
able to meet any new issue presented by Juanita5s proposed amendment, or that it would be 
disadvantaged by the amendment. Juanita was not attempting to add additional parties or 
new causes of action or theories of recovery. Her proposed amendment did not go the merits 
of her case. Her proposed amendment would not have delayed the scheduled trial. 
Juanita did not seek to change any liability sought against Metropolitan or Martin 
Briceno. In Wells v. Wells. 272 P.2d 67 (Utah, 1954), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
an amendment may be allowed if it does not change the liability sought to be enforced 
against the defendant. The court stated that even if the amendment created a new cause of 
action, amendment should be allowed if the new cause of action is not wholly different from 
those already alleged. Wells. Id. at 170. Juanita5s proposed amendment is completely in 
keeping with the causes of action alleged in her original petition. 
Juanita filed her motion to amend in April 1997, four months prior to trial, and two 
months prior to the discovery cut off date. Juanita alleges that the filing of this motion was 
not untimely. However, if the Court finds that the motion was made untimely, the Court 
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should also find that the untimeliness was justified. In Chadwick v. Neilsen. 763 P.2d 817 
(Ct. App. Utah 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals held that there are occasions where justice 
excuses untimeliness: 
A motion to amend raised shortly before or at trial, in response to facts 
discovered subsequent to the prior pleading, should be allowed if there is a 
reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering the facts and the 
amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the opposing party. 
Id. at 820, quoting Girard v. Applebv. 660 P.3d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
Juanita sought to amend her petition to reflect current factual data which did not exist 
at the time of her original petition for marriage adjudication. Her motion, memorandum in 
support thereof, and her affidavit filed in opposition to Metropolitan's motion for summary 
judgment all provided adequate explanation for her motivation in seeking an amendment and 
the reason for the timeliness of her motion. 
Metropolitan did not present any evidence to support a claim that it needed more time 
for discovery due to the amendment. Because the two issues are inextricably linked, the 
same evidence required to prove or disprove the existence of a marriage is the same evidence 
required to prove or disprove a continuation of the relationship. For the reasons set forth 
above, the trial court erred in denying Juanita5 s motion to amend. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING METROPOLITAN'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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A. Legal Standard. Summary judgment may be granted only if the record shows 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving, Inc. V. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
On review of a grant of summary judgment, the inquiry is whether there is any 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Because 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of law, the Supreme Court reviews the trial court's 
ruling for correctness, White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1994), and gives no 
deference to the trial court's legal determinations, Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 
P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. Utah 1993). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and the 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
B. Metropolitan's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court's Conclusions 
of Law, 
Juanita challenges the following conclusion of law made by the trial court: 
Conclusion of Law No. 7: Petitioner is not and has never been married to 
Martin Briceno in any solemnized or unsolemnized relationship. 
C. Marshaling of Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Conclusions of Law. 
Appellant marshals the following evidence to support the trial court's order granting 
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summary judgment and for the conclusion of law challenged: 
1. U.C.A. §30-1-4.5(2) states that an adjudication of marriage must be established 
either during the relationship or within one year following the termination of the relationship. 
(Addendum A) 
2. Juanita alleged in her original petition that her relationship with Martin 
terminated on October 21, 1995, the day of the fire. (Record 1-2) 
3. Juanita testified in a sworn statement taken by counsel for Metropolitan before 
it became a party in intervention, that her relationship with Martin terminated in June of 
1995. (Record 460, p. 5) 
4. At no time during the pendency of her marriage adjudication proceeding did 
Juanita apply to the trial court for an accelerated trial setting. (Entire Record) 
5. The trial on Juanita's petition for marriage adjudication was not held within one 
year from October 21, 1995. (Entire Record) 
6. Juanita did not establish her marriage with Martin within one year from October 
21, 1995. (Entire Record) 
D. There is a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment 
The parties dispute whether Juanita established a "new" relationship with Martin after 
their reconciliation, or whether their reconciliation was a continuation of their 13 year 
relationship. This disputed fact is material inasmuch as the statute requires that a common 
law marriage be established within one year following the termination of a relationship. 
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Juanita's affidavit testimony in opposition to Metropolitan's motion for summary 
judgment states that she and Martin reconciled to re-establish their relationship. Her 
pleadings and testimony allege that the relationship, in fact, never ended and was continuing 
and ongoing. 
Metropolitan disputed Juanita's claim that her relationship with Martin did not 
terminate. However, Metropolitan did not file any affidavits, or submit any evidence, to 
oppose Juanita's testimony. Metropolitan simply relied on the averments of Juanita's initial 
pleadings which stated that the relationship had terminated on October 21, 1995, the day of 
the fire. 
At oral argument, counsel for Metropolitan did not dispute that Juanita and Martin had 
reconciled, but disputed that the reconciliation showed a continuation of the relationship. 
Metropolitan produced no evidence whatsoever to support this claim. 
The record of the oral argument shows that the issue was disputed. After counsel for 
Juanita argued for amendment of her petition based on the fact that Juanita had reconciled 
with Martin, counsel for Metropolitan argued his position that Juanita and Martin's 
relationship had terminated, and that she should not be allowed to assert otherwise. At the 
June 30, 1997 hearing, counsel for Metropolitan stated: 
[Mr. Stevens:] Your Honor, you articulated some of our concerns here. The 
facts, I don't think, are really in dispute. Some of the timing is. (Emphasis 
Added). (Record 460, p. 5) 
The timing which counsel for Metropolitan admits is in dispute is the very essence of 
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Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment. (Record 177 -178; Record 179 -184) 
Mr. Stevens then brought to the court's attention that as part of Metropolitan's 
investigation of the fire, and before its intervention in the marriage adjudication proceedings, 
he took Juanita's sworn statement. (Record 460, p. 5) Mr. Stevens stated to the court that 
during her sworn statement Juanita testified that she thought her relationship with Martin was 
over in June 1995, but that they subsequently got back together. Metropolitan's own 
argument brings to light the nature of the couple's relationship, and the fact that Juanita had 
previously, albeit erroneously, thought her relationship with Martin had ended, when in fact 
it had not. Counsel for Metropolitan then argued these very facts to the contrary: 
[Mr. Stevens]: I will accept her statement that she has renewed her 
relationship. I am not going to question that here today, but the facts don't 
show they meant this kind of continuing relationship she is alleging. (Record 
460, p. 8) 
Although counsel for Metropolitan opined that the facts do not show that Juanita's 
renewal of her relationship with Martin meant a continuing relationship, his opinion flies in 
the face of the facts which he brought to the trial court's attention just minutes before. The 
facts show that Juanita had a history of estrangement and reconciliation with Martin, which 
history would have been made even clearer to the court at an evidentiary hearing or a trial 
on the merits. 
Metropolitan did not dispute that Juanita had renewed her relationship with Martin. 
It disputed that it was a continuing relationship. As the moving party, Metropolitan had the 
burden to prove that the renewal of Juanita and Martin's relationship did not constitute a 
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continuing relationship. Metropolitan failed to provide the court with any evidence to show 
it was not a continuing relationship. There are no facts m existence to support Metropolitan's 
argument that it was not a continuing relationship. Evidence tending to conclusively 
establish that a couple had terminated their relationship would include evidence showing that 
one of the parties had been or was engaged to marry someone else, or had entered into a 
lawful marriage with someone else, or had lived with or was currently living with someone 
else in a sexual relationship. Further evidence showing a discontinuance of a relationship 
would be evidence that the woman took someone else's last name as her own, or that she 
represented herself to be married to someone else. There was absolutely no evidence of this 
nature before the Court. Metropolitan failed to establish this essential element of its claim 
for summary judgment. 
E. The Trial Court's Erroneous View of the Law. 
In making its determination that Juanita terminated her relationship with Martin on 
October 21, 1995, the trial court erroneously relied on Juanita's seemingly inconsistent 
statements. Juanita testified in her sworn statement during Metropolitan's investigation of 
the fire, and before Metropolitan intervened, that her relationship with Martin had terminated 
on October 21,1995, and she alleged the same in her original petition. After she reconciled 
with Martin she submitted an affidavit stating that their relationship had not terminated. The 
trial court denied Juanita's motion to amend, and subsequently granted Metropolitan's 
motion for summary judgment, based on its erroneous view that it could not accept the 
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seemingly inconsistent testimony submitted in Juanita*s subsequent affidavit: 
In this court's view, when you examine the affidavit of Ms. Gonzalez, it 
clearly states that she considered the relationship permanently terminated on 
October 21, 1995. In this court's view, that is the best scenario for Ms. 
Gonzalez. The original petition said that the relationship was terminated on 
that date. There was an amended petition that said the same thing. 
In addition to the sworn statement which, while the statements vary, like I say 
in its best light, it embraces a termination date on the 21st of October, 1995. 
It would be totally inconsistent with, in this court's view, the overwhelming 
assertions by Ms. Gonzalez to allow the amendment. For those reasons, the 
court is going to deny the Motion to Amend. (Record 460, p. 9) 
The trial court's view is contrary to Utah common law. The Utah Supreme Court has 
addressed whether an affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, which 
is contrary to the affiant's prior testimony, may create an issue of fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
In Webster v.SilL 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
circumstances in which it is appropriate to rely on a subsequent, inconsistent affidavit: 
The rule that a moving party may not rely upon his own affidavit which 
contradicts his deposition must be administered with care.... The rule that a 
party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts his deposition to 
create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment does not apply 
when there is some substantial likelihood that the deposition testimony 
was in error for reasons that appear in the deposition or the party 
deponent is able to state in his affidavit an adequate explanation for the 
contradictory answer in his deposition. (Emphasis Added). 
Webster. Id. at 1172. In the case at bar, Juanita believed her testimony was correct when she 
stated her relationship with Martin terminated on October 21, 1995, but subsequent events 
proved her statements to be in error. The nature of the couple's stormy relationship, and the 
66 
lack of any evidence suggesting she had not continued her relationship with Martin 
substantiates the likelihood that her prior testimony was in error. Furthermore, Juanita's 
affidavit clearly explains the discrepancy. The following paragraphs are taken from her 
affidavit: 
3. Martin and I have had stormy periods of time in our relationship, and we 
have broken up and reunited several times in the past. 
4. On October 21, 1995, when Martin burned down our family home and all 
our possessions, I considered our relationship permanently terminated. 
5. Since that time, I have re-established a relationship with Martin and have 
been working with his attorney to prevent his deportation from the United 
States. 
6. I have submitted papers to the Utah State Prison for leave to marry Martin. 
7. I intend to marry Martin as soon as possible, because I can't wait any 
longer for the adjudication to go through. (Record 185 -187) 
This explanation satisfies the requirement set forth in Webster, Id. At the hearing, counsel 
for Juanita explained the change in her testimony: 
There is a period of time she really didn't want to have that much to do with 
him, but that has changed and she wants him now and plans on marrying him. 
And as far as I can see, the relationship has not ended. They have there [sic] 
typical ups and downs. The typical things which you find is in every 
relationship. Where there is separation, the parties say its over. That doesn't 
mean it is over. If the relationship continues, it continues. And it is good 
public policy to allow a couple who say their relationship is continuing, to be 
able to legitimize that marriage and legitimize the children's status and allow 
the marriage to be adjudicated and allow the petition to be amended. (Record 
460, p. 5) 
The instant case is further distinguished from Webster. Id., in that Juanita's affidavit 
67 
was not submitted to contradict facts which existed at the time of her prior testimony — her 
affidavit averred that the facts had changed. Counsel for Juanita brought this distinction to 
the court's attention: 
. . .Yes, she said it was over. That is how she felt at the time. I think that it a 
different kind of a situation than changing your testimony as to the facts and 
whether the facts were facts which were read or the facts were in the colloquy. 
I think it is more akin to people who are afraid of dogs after a dog bite. And 
in a year or so they are over it and say, "I am not afraid of dogs anymore." 
I think a person is entitled to change their feelings and this statute particularly 
is enacted to accommodate a couple by saying it is good if a couple say they 
haven't broken up. We should believe them. (Record 460, p. 3) 
In Gawv. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (Ct. App. Utah 1990), the Court of Appeals considered 
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant. In Gaw, Id., the 
plaintiff alleged personal injuries as a result of faulty road design by the State of Utah. She 
repeatedly testified at her deposition that she was not confused by the intersection where the 
accident happened. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the facts to 
which plaintiff testified in her original deposition. The plaintiff opposed summary judgment, 
and in support thereof filed an affidavit which contained averments contradicting her original 
deposition testimony. The trial court disregarded plaintiffs affidavit and granted summary 
judgment. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiffs subsequent affidavit, 
although directly contradicting her deposition testimony, was properly before the trial court 
and raised issues of material fact, precluding summary judgment. Relying on Webster v. Sill 
the Court held that Gaw's affidavit was properly before the court because, unlike the affidavit 
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in Webster, plaintiffs affidavit w4did not wholly fail to explain the discrepancy". Gaw, 798 
P.2d at 1140. The Court went on to explain that at the time of the taking of her deposition, 
plaintiff assumed certain facts regarding the layout of the intersection and the lane in which 
in the accident happened and her testimony reflected her assumptions: later, the plaintiff 
discovered her assumptions were incorrect and attempted to change her testimony 
accordingly. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment, stating: 
Although the trial court in this case apparently did not believe Gaw's 
explanation for the discrepancies, we find her explanation is not inherently 
inconsistent with the responses in her initial deposition. We do not have to be 
persuaded by the explanation or even find it compelling. As long as it is 
plausible, the fact finding should be allowed to weigh the credibility of the 
explanation. 
See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986). Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1141. 
This instant case is similar to Gaw, Id., in that Juanita assumed her relationship with 
Martin was over at the time Metropolitan took her sworn statement. Her assumption 
continued until she and Martin reconciled. Juanita's subsequent reconciliation (and 
subsequent lawful marriage) with Martin is a fact which substantiates that her prior testimony 
was based on her incorrect assumption that their relationship was irreconcilable and 
permanently terminated. Because her prior testimony was based on her incorrect assumption, 
the contradictory facts averred to in her affidavit sufficiently raise a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
Furthermore, the explanation contained in Juanita's affidavit is plausible, which 
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should have precluded summary judgment. The trial court applied an incorrect standard in 
its view of Juanita's affidavit. Rather than considering whether the explanation for Juanita's 
affidavit testimony was plausible, the trial court incorrectly weighed the evidence and 
Juanita's credibility. 
F. The trial court erred in not viewing the facts and inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to Juanita Gonzalez. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court views the facts and the 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Contrary to well established principles 
of law, the trial court in the case at bar did not view the inferences of Juanita's testimony in 
a light which was favorable to her, let alone in a light most favorable to her. The issue of 
whether this was a new or continuing relationship has been discussed in detail in a preceding 
section of this brief. In the context of whether to grant or deny a motion for summary 
judgment, the arguments are even stronger that the court should have accepted Juanita's 
uncontested and unrefuted testimony that she considered her relationship with Martin to be 
a continuing relationship, not a "new" one. There were no intervening events which would 
signify that Martin and Juanita's relationship had terminated, other than Juanita's own belief 
that proved to be erroneous. Evidence of an intervening marriage to a third person, or 
evidence of co-habitation, or an engagement to a third person, would have supported 
Metropolitan's claim that Juanita and Martin's relationship had terminated, and 
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that their subsequent reconciliation was a "new" relationship. Evidence of any of these events 
may have been enough to contravene Juanita's testimony. However, in the absence of any 
evidence, Juanita's testimony should have been considered sufficient to defeat the motion 
for summary judgment. 
G. The Trial Court Erred in Weighing the Credibility of Juanita's Testimony. 
During oral argument, counsel for Metropolitan insinuated that Juanita was not being 
truthful in her affidavit. Mr. Stevens told the court, "I think it just doesn't stand up the smell 
test . . ." (Record 460, p. 7) It is a well established principle of law that a credibility issue 
cannot be determined on summary judgment. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 
1996); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). If the trial court had any doubts 
that Juanita's affidavit was truthful, summary judgment should have been denied so that a 
full trial on the merits could establish whether or not her testimony was truthful. Affidavits 
submitted on summary judgment motions are to aid the court in determining whether there 
are any material facts in dispute. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967). 
Juanita's affidavit showed that the parties disputed that her relationship with Martin had 
terminated. The trial court erroneously weighed the evidence presented by Juanita's affidavit 
and concluded that Juanita had not continued her relationship with Martin. The trial court 
concluded that Juanita and Martin had never been married based on its finding that Juanita 
and Martin's relationship had terminated October 21, 1995 and their marriage had not been 
adjudicated within one year from that date. (Record 429 - 433; Record 434 - 436) 
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H. The Trial Court's Erroneous View of the Law Permitting Metropolitan's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court allowed Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment based on the 
affirmative defense that Juanita had not met the statutory time limitation. Because 
Metropolitan had not asserted this defense prior to the motion, and had not amended its 
complaint to include the defense, Metropolitan should have been estopped from raising it on 
a motion for summary judgment. Metropolitan did not, at any time, preserve the defense of 
timeliness under U.C.A. §30-1.4.5. Metropolitan did not set forth this defense in its 
complaint in intervention (Record 5 - 9), nor did it seek to amend its complaint to preserve 
this defense. 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that affirmative defenses must 
be set forth in the pleadings, and if not set forth, they are waived. The result of failure to 
plead, and failure to provide notice to the opposing party is that the defense is waived. See 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983). In Staker, Id., 
the trial court denied the defendant's motion to amend its answer to include the statute of 
limitations defense, when the motion was made on the morning of trial. The Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, noting that the defendant failed to raise the defense 
in its original answer to the complaint, and failed to amend the answer prior to trial. Id. at 
1189. Metropolitan raised the issue of timeliness under the statute for the first time in its 
motion for summary judgment dated April 10, 1997. (Record 177 - 178) Had Juanita 
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known from the outset that Metropolitan would seek dismissal of the petition after October 
of 1996, Juanita could have asked for an expedited hearing prior to October 1996. Both 
parties agreed to a scheduling order and trial date which put the adjudication hearing after 
October of 1996, and yet, only after the first trial date was continued by the court, did 
Metropolitan raise the issue that Juanita was beyond one year of the termination of her 
relationship with Martin, and only after Metropolitan had been informed that Juanita and 
Martin had reconciled. (Record 460, p. 2) 
The one-year time limitation of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 is an affirmative defense which 
must be set forth in the pleadings or it should be considered waived. The purpose of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure with regard to pleadings is to allow all parties to have full and fair 
notice of claims and defenses. By not pleading this specific defense, Metropolitan deprived 
Juanita of the opportunity to have her petition determined prior to the one year cutoff, or to 
obtain a stipulation to extend the hearing beyond the time limitation. For these reasons, the 
court's order granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and 
Juanita should be allowed to proceed with her petition for adjudication of marriage. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court should reverse the trial court's orders 
granting Metropolitan's motion for summary judgment, denying Juanita's motion to dismiss 
Metropolitan's complaint in intervention and denying Juanita's motion to amend her petition, 
and further should find the time limitation provision in the marriage adjudication statute to 
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be unconstitutional on its face and/or as applied to Juanita Gonzalez. 
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